Food Distribution Center


***KEN FREELAND

Attending delegates met with Dr. Mohammed Mahdi Saleh, Iraq's Minister of Trade, who turned out to be quite an engaging speaker.  He spent a great deal of time with us, and after addressing us, answered all the questions we put to him — and this despite the fact that we were late in arriving. According to Dr. Mahdi Saleh:

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq's annual imports totaled $20 billion [* please see my end notes regarding this figure before citing it].  At that time, Iraq depended on the operation of the free market, and on some price subsidies, to assure distribution of necessary items to the populace.

Since the imposition of the sanctions regime, Iraq has instituted a rationing system which the United Nations (FAO) has determined to be so fair and equitable that it has proposed to use it as a model for other countries in which food shortages necessitate a similar approach.  The system is fully computerized, contains many checks and balances that protect against potential abuse, and emphasizes the principle of equality of quantity, quality and price of all rationed items throughout the country.

The ration itself fluctuates from month to month, based on availability of various items and price fluctuations.  The monthly ration is announced publicly over radio stations at the start of each month.

The per-person ration for the current month was set at 9 kilograms of (wheat) flour, 2.5 k of rice, 2 k of sugar, 1 k of cooking oil, 2.7 k. Of baby milk, 150 grams of tea, 250 grams of salt and 350 grams of detergent. The cost for a family of fifteen would be 1500 dynars per month, about $1.00, or in other words, about 100 dynars (less than a dime) per person.

In urban areas the retail centers with whom the government contracts to distribute rations to local residents are in easy walking distance. [It seems to me that something was also mentioned about assisting those in rural areas to access their ration, but I didn't get this . . .]

The retailers are kept honest by a system in which any complaint lodged by a consumer against a particular retailer leads to a plebiscite of local consumers.  If 51% agree with the allegation, the retailer loses his franchise, and is replaced.

During the Gulf war, agricultural centers in 13 Iraqi provinces were targeted.  In all, 48 flour mills were bombed, for a loss of productive capacity of 5,000 tons per day of flour, and 123,000 sq. meters of grain storage capacity.

One way the Iraqis coped was by creating a kind of ersatz flour to replace the pure wheat flour they were accustomed to, using a combination of wheat, barley and corn flour — the resulting bread was termed "sanction bread."

Iraqis have had to resort to smuggling to get food and medicine into their country.  Dr. Mahdi Saleh related a story of how a vessel was waiting to be unloaded in the port of Al Aqabah, with food bound for Iraq, but political pressure was put on the Jordanian government to refuse to unload it.  The cargo was eventually "donated" to a third country. Likewise, 2000 lbs. of powdered baby milk on order from the Nestle Company via Turkey was likewise interdicted.

Iraq's foreign assets, totaling some $4 billion, have been frozen since the original imposition of sanctions prior to the Gulf war.  UN resolution 778 prohibits the use of these assets for any use, including the provision of food or medicine.  They can only be used (and are used) to pay the costs of UNSCOM.

In response to the question "Why, if the rationing system is so equitable, are people so badly off nutritionally?" Dr. Mahdi Saleh noted the absence of animal or vegetable proteins in the ration basket. The ministry hoped to be able to include ½ kilogram of cheese in next month's ration basket, however, this will be very costly — about $1/4 billion for a six-month supply.

Iraq is currently permitted to spend $2.6 billion through the "food for oil" deal — this represents 10% of what was spent on 18 million Iraqis prior to the sanctions (whereas the current population of Iraqis now 23 million!) [*again, please see my end notes before citing this figure].

Prior to 1988, 25% of America rice exports were purchased by Iraq.

Iraq is currently striving for agricultural self-sufficiency.  There has been some progress towards this goal, with food production increasing in some sectors up to sixfold.  However, this process is inhibited by four factors:

 1) Salinity of oil [we witnessed this on the ride to Basra — you could actually see the salt on the soil surface in the salt-marsh];

2) Lack of usable agricultural machinery (no spare parts available due to sanctions)

3) Lack of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers (due to sanctions)

4) Lack of irrigation (due to lack of electricity — Iraq is currently operating on about 1/3 of its pre-war level of 11,000 megawatts      (due to the war and sanctions) $1/4 billion will be invested in agricultural production in the next six months. Iraq now boasts of a corn surplus, whereas formerly it bought all of its corn from the United States Iraq has purchased $220 million of wheat and white beans from the United States since April 1997. The Trade Minister also showed us a propaganda movie which detailed the struggle for economic survival Iraq has undergone since the war, and the role of the Trade Ministry in effecting this.  The film contained some very explicit and impressive footage of damage to agricultural targets during the war.  Dr. Mahdi Saleh promised to make a copy available to us (the film had an English language voice-over). [Hopefully the International Action Center staff have received this, or can inquire after it through the Iraq Interests Section in New York.  I think this footage would be very useful in demonstrating the civilian targeting that took place during the war, and its purpose to provide "post war leverage" in effecting political change in Iraq.  I expect that copies will be made available at cost to organizers in other areas, and especially to all of the delegates.] Afterwards, he made the following comments:

Forces within the United States ("Zionist interests") have had it in for Iraq since before the crisis in Kuwait.  Iraq became militarily strong during the Iran-Iraq war, and it became a Zionist objective to reduce Iraq's military and economic strength.  Just one month after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, in September of 1988, a bill was introduced and [I believe] passed by Congress authorizing "sanctions against Iraq" for "gross violations of human rights."  This bill was vetoed by Reagan under pressure from the agricultural export lobbies.  The bill finally passed presidential muster in 1990 (George Bush) after certain food exports were specifically exempted.  All this was before the invasion of Kuwait.

According to Dr. Mahdi Saleh, the Zionists have two objectives:

1) To destroy all individual achievements made during the Iran-Iraq War, both military and civilian

2)To reduce the price of oil so that Iraq cannot gain sufficient revenues.

"Kuwait is a key player."  General Schwarzkopf came to Kuwait in 1988 to prepare the way for what eventually followed: Kuwait was specifically instructed by the CIA to refuse to settle the border issue with Iraq at that time (despite Iraq's overtures to that end). Kuwait was instructed to gather intelligence on Iraq and Iran, and to keep the situation between the two of them as tense as possible.

[In response to a question from one of the delegates about the price of oil before and after the imposition of sanctions:] In 1988/1989 the price of oil was approx. $20 - $22 dollars per barrel.  After the sanctions, the price rose to $40.  Now it is back to its pre-sanctions price level.  Iraq suffers a loss of $1 billion for each one dollar reduction in the price of oil.

* Endnote/ disclaimer: I have tried to render Dr. Mahdi Saleh's comments as accurately as I can recall them, given the haste in which I took my notes. I hope that any corrections any delegate may have will be quickly forwarded for the benefit of others.  I am particularly concerned with the accuracy of one statistic, though I am very sure that this was the figure cited by the Trade Minister; that Iraq's pre- war level of import was $20 billion.  I know I have seen this figure elsewhere, but on the other hand, an excellent study that I highly recommend to anyone interested, "Sanctions Against Iraq — Costs of Failure" prepared by the Center for Economic and Social Rights, puts this figure much lower, viz.: "The impact if sanctions was to abruptly end revenues from oil exports, and also to cut Iraq off from other sources of finance such as foreign borrowing.  The effect on imports was dramatic.  As shown in Table 1, total Iraqi imports fell from $10.3 billion in 1988 to just $0.4 billion by 1991." (p. 8)  And Table 1 shows that 1988 was by far the largest import year in the last decade for Iraq. None of this detracts from the massive economic shock involved, of course.

It may be that the discrepancy is due to different methods of evaluating imports.  I simply want to caution any reader against citing this statistic of $20 billion in imports unless you can find some way of explaining this disparity.  Perhaps a more useful approach, which is easier to document, is to say that "When evaluated at the market exchange rate, oil exports equaled 75% of Iraqi GDP in 1990."  This is from the same report (p.7) and cites the Economist Intelligence Unit (1995) as its source.

 

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