JUDGES OF DEATH
by Mumia Abu-Jamal
Column Written 11/6/98
© 1998 Mumia Abu-Jamal All Rights Reserve
A Fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness....[T]o perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."--In re Murchison, US Supreme Court (1955)
If you stop the average American on the street, Black or white, and ask them about the U.S. Constitutional right to adequate counsel, most would agree easily that such a right is an important Constitutional guarantee, one long accepted by the people.
But, what is a right, even one written on paper, and even on a piece of paper that is known and revered as a Constitution, in comparison to what happened, and what continues to happen, in real life?
Consider the following real-life cases in front of American judges:
1) A lawyer, fresh out of law school, who never took classes in criminal law, criminal procedure, or trial advocacy while in law school; who never tried a jury or felony trial, was appointed to represent a man charged with a capital case, facing death (see Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992).
2) Can a lawyer who was an alcoholic, who was arrested while en route to court one morning, and found to have a blood alcohol level of O.27mg/1, meaningfully represent a man facing a death sentence that day? The California Appeals Court, in People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989) found it O.K.
3) Can a lawyer who is a drug addict, hyped up on amphetamines and other drugs, and who later pleads guilty to state and federal drug charges (after the trial) have been, in any way, a meaningful advocate for his client facing death (see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994)? Some supreme courts have said yes.
4) Is it fair that a lawyer can refer to a client as "a little old nigger boy" to a jury in a capital case (see Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982)?
Real cases. Real life. Real law, as applied to the lives and liberties of real people, who were tried, or appealed their cases before political tribunals masquerading as courts of equity, where "justice" is just a word carved on the marble façade, and where politics is the guiding force and engine that determines every result.
What is the difference between a politician and a judge? When one researches this question the answer becomes abundantly clear. Nothing:
It is becoming increasingly apparent that these political pressures have a significant impact on the fairness and integrity of capital trials. When presiding over a highly publicized capital case, a judge who declines to hand down a sentence of death, or who insists on upholding the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign his own political death warrant. In such circumstances, state court judges who desire to remain in office are no more able to protect the rights of an accused in a criminal case than elected judges have been to protect the civil rights of racial minorities against majority sentiment. As Justice Stevens observed, "Not surprisingly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death penalty." [from Judges and the Politics of Death, 75 Boston U. L.R.759 (1995),pp. 765-766] (also, Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995) (Dissenting Opin.)
When one looks at it, one learns that judges are, above all, politicians. That is the case in Philadelphia as well:
A study of capital cases in Philadelphia found that "Philadelphia's poor defendants often find themselves being represented by ward leaders, ward committeemen, failed politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders, and contributors to the judges' election campaign." The lawyer who received the most appointments one year to homicide cases in Philadelphia was a former judge whom the state's supreme court removed from the bench for receiving union money. He handled thirty-four murder cases in that year and submitted bills for $84,650 for fees and expenses.
As might be expected, treating the assignment of criminal cases as part of a judicial patronage system does not always result in the best legal representation. The study of capital cases in Philadelphia found that "even officials in charge of the system say they wouldn't want to be represented in Traffic Court by some of the people appointed to defend poor people accused of murder." [p.803)
What kind of law is that?
MAJ©1998