Korea International War Crimes Tribunal, June 23, 2001, New York
Report on US Crimes in Korea 1945-2001

3. The Question of American Responsibility
for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising

 

Prof. Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago

Paper presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the April 3, 1948 Chejudo Rebellion, Tokyo, March 14, 1998

I am honored to have been invited to this conference, and I thank the organizers for all they have done to make my visit possible. I wish to address a single question in my lecture, which is the legal and moral responsibility of the United States for the widespread massacres and unsparing brutality with which the Chejudo rebellion was suppressed.

Under the relevant international law at the time, from August 15, 1945 to August 15, 1948, the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) was the sole legal authority in Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Under secret protocols, the U.S. also had operational control of the South Korean armed forces and national police from August 15, 1948 to June 30, 1949. [1]

The United States and the American people were then, and remain today, responsible for events that occurred during that occupation. It is that responsibility which I wish to demonstrate and assess.

Recently some Koreans have begun to demand redress for their suffering during the Korean War. Last August a group of villagers in Yongdong County, made up of survivors and bereaved family members, petitioned the South Korean and American governments for compensation for the massacre by American soldiers and pilots of at least 100 people from Chugok village in the period July 26-29, 1950. [2]

There were similar massacres by American and South Korean troops throughout the summer of 1950; one former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operative witnessed the systematic slaughter of 1800 political prisoners at Suwon, shortly after the war broke out:

I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bull-dozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a big line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave.[3]

However horrible these episodes may be, they occurred during wartime. On Cheju Island similar things happened throughout the guerrilla zone, in 'peacetime' under the American Occupation.

Many others present here today know much more than I do about the April 3 uprising. At the time I conducted my research on this tragic episode in the history of Korean-American relations, very little material was available in the Korean language because of a uniform suppression of information and a barrage of propaganda and historical revisionism by the South Korean government, and the relative distance and lack of involvement in Cheju affairs of the North Korean government.

I utilized the work of Korean exiles in Osaka, especially Kim Pong-hyon and Kim Min-ju, but mainly I relied on heretofore secret documents in the U.S. National Archives. These materials include everything from local police reports to investigative studies done by the U.S. Military Government; they were all prepared at the time (in 1948 and 1949) by the relevant authorities and information-gathering agencies, and they are therefore the best primary documentation an historian can find. What I am about to say is therefore not a matter of opinion or interpretation; it is well documented and unimpeachable fact.

What these materials document is a merciless, wholesale assault on the people of Cheju Island. No one will ever know how many islanders died in this onslaught, but the American data, long kept secret, ranged between 30,000 and 60,000 killed, with upwards of 40,000 more people having fled to Japan. More recent research suggests a figure of 80,000 killed.[4] There were at most 300,000 people living on Cheju Island in the late 1940s.

The Cheju Insurgency

The effective political leadership on Cheju until early 1948 was provided by strong leftwing people's committees that first emerged in August 1945, and later continued under the American Occupation (1945-1948). The Occupation preferred to ignore Cheju rather than to do much about the committees; it appointed a formal mainland leadership but let the people of the island run their own affairs.

The result was an entrenched leftwing, one with no important ties to the North and few to the South Korean Workers Party (SKWP) on the mainland; the island was aslo well and peaceably governed in 1945-48, when contrasted to the mainland. In early 1948 as Syngman Rhee and his American supporters moved to institute his power in a separate southern regime, the Cheju people responded with a strong guerrilla insurgency that soon tore the island apart.

Before Rhee came to power, silenced his officials, and blamed the whole rebellion on alien communist agitators, Koreans in USAMGIK attributed the origins of the insurgency to the long tenure of the Cheju governing committees and subsequent police and rightwing youth-group terrorism.

An official investigation by USAMGIK Judge Yang Wan-il conducted in June 1948 found that "the People's Committee of Cheju Island, which was formed after the Liberation ... has exercised its power as a de facto government." He also found that "the police have failed to win the hearts of the people by treating them cruelly."

A Seoul prosecutor, Wu T'aek-yun, said the troubles began because of official incompetence, not "leftist agitation." Lt. Col. Kim Paik-Il, commander of Constabulary (military) units on the island when the rebellion began, said that the blame for the uprising "should be laid entirely at the door of the police force."

The American occupation commander, John R. Hodge, told a group of visiting American Congressmen in October 1947 that Cheju was "a truly communal area that is peacefully controlled by the People's Committee without much Comintern influence."

Shortly thereafter a U.S. Military Government (USAMGIK) investigation estimated that "approximately two-thirds of the populace" on the island were "moderate leftist" in their opinions. The chairman of leftist organization, a former Cheju governor named Pak, was "not a Communist and [was] very pro-American." The people were deeply separatist and did not like mainlanders; their wish was to be left alone.

The survey determined, however, that Cheju had been subjected to a campaign of official terrorism in recent months. According to Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) information, the current governor, Yu Hae-jin, was an "extreme rightist," a mainlander with connections to the rightwing Kwangbok and Taedong youth groups; he was "ruthless and dictatorial in his dealing with opposing political parties."

He thought anyone who did not support Syngman Rhee or Kim Sung-su was "automatically leftist;" for months in 1947 he had sought to prevent "any meeting by any party except those he definitely approves."

Governor Yu had filled national police units on the island with mainlanders and refugees from northern Korea, who worked together with "ultra rightist party terrorists." Some 365 prisoners were in the Cheju city jail in late 1947; an American investigator witnessed 35 of them crowded into a 10' by 12' cell.

"Direct control of food rationing" had also been placed in the hands of "politicians" responsive to Yu, who operated out of myon offices. Unauthorized grain collections had been five times as high as official ones in 1947.

When Americans interviewed Gov. Yu in February 1948, he acknowledged that he had utilized "extreme rightist power" to reorient the Cheju people, "the large majority" of whom were leftist in his judgement. He justified this by saying that "there was no middle line" in Island politics; one supported either the left or the right. He said the police controlled all political meetings, and would not allow the "extreme leftists" to meet. Although the author of the survey called for Gov. Yu's dismissal, Gen. William F. Dean decided in late March 1948 not to remove Yu. [5]

Perhaps the affair that most inflamed the island population was the unleashing of the rightwing terrorist group known as the Northwest Youth (Suh Buk Ch'ongnyon-dan, NWY) to control and reorient leftists. In late 1947 the CIC had "warned" the NWY about their "widespread campaign of terrorism" on Cheju. Under the American command, these same youths joined the police and Constabulary in the Cheju guerrilla suppression campaigns. As a special Korean press survey put it in June 1948:

Since the coming of a youth organization, whose members are young men from Northwest Korea, the feeling between the [island] inhabitants and those from the mainland has been growing tense....They may have been inspired by the Communists. Yet, how shall we understand how over 30,000 men have roused themselves to action in defiance of gun and sword. Without cause, there can be no action.

The Northwest Youth was said to have "exercised police power more than the police itself and their cruel behavior has invited the deep resentment of the inhabitants." [6]

After a March 1, 1948 demonstration against the separate elections on the mainland, the police arrested 2,500 young people; islanders soon fished the dead body of one of them out of a river: he had been tortured to death. This, Col. Kim thought, was the incident that provoked the original rebellion on April 3 that subsequently marked the start of the insurgency. [7]

The April 3 uprising occured mostly along the north coast of Cheju, with attacks on eleven police stations and various other incidents--roads and bridges destroyed, telephone wires cut. The demonstrators denounced the separate elections and called for unification with the North.

Three rebels died, as did four police and twelve rightists. When news of the rebellion spread to the mainland, signal fires were lit in the hills near the port of Mokp'o, and demonstrators came out to shout hurrah for "the Korean People's Republic" (the one organized in Seoul in 1945, not the North Korean republic).

In May as the election proceeded on the mainland, the rebellion spread to the west coast of the island, with some 35 police and rightists killed by May 15; the next day police began rounding up civilians, taking 169 prisoners in two villages thought to have assisted the guerrillas. No election could be conducted on the island. By the end of May the violence had left only the eastern coast untouched; Constabulary units swept the mountains from east to west. [8]

A month later an American colonel, Rothwell H. Brown, reported that Korean and American military units had interrogated fully 4,000 inhabitants of Cheju, determining that a "People's Democratic Army" had been formed in April, composed of two regiments of guerrillas; its strength was estimated at 4,000 officers and men, although less then one-tenth had firearms.

The remainder carried swords, spears and farm implements. In other words this was a hastily-assembled peasant army. Interrogators also found evidence that the SKWP had infiltrated "not over [Chisato--this means "no more than"] six trained agitators and organizers" from the mainland, and none had come from north Korea; with some 500 to 700 allies on the island, they had established cells in most towns and villages.

Sixty to seventy thousand islanders had joined the party, Brown asserted, although it seems much more likely that such figures refer to longstanding membership in people's committees and mass organizations. "They were for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties." [9]

Yi Tong-ku was the commander of the rebels; he had been born in Shinch'on [Chisato--not ch'n] village on the island in 1924 into a family of poor fishermen-peasants. He subsequently went to Osaka as a child laborer, as did his brother and his sister. He returned to Sinch'on just after the Liberation, and became a Worker's Party activist in Choch'? township. He was arrested and tortured for three months in 1947, and thereafter began organizing guerrillas. [10]

The guerrillas generally were known as the "inmin-gun" or People's Army, estimated to be 3,000 to 4,000 strong. But they were not centrally commanded and operated in mobile units (kidong pudae) eighty or a hundred strong that often had little connection with other rebels. This, of course, was one of the elements that made the movement hard to suppress. CIC elements found no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment. [11]

The National Police (KNP) were directly involved in sending the NWY to the island, and worked closely with them. The police refused to admit any responsibility for the eruption of the violence, blaming agitators from North Korea for the trouble.

These organizers were able to stir up the population, the KNP thought, because "the learned and wealthy" had the habit of living on the mainland, leaving "only the ignorant" people on Cheju. It was necessary to appoint officials from the mainland, the police said, because local people were all inter-related [i.e., family relatives] and would not work "strongly and resolutely" in dealing with unrest. The KNP superintendent recommended that "patriotic young men's associations" be promoted, and the institution of "assembly villages" to concentrate the population and drain rural support away from the guerrillas. [12]

In his own report Col. Brown said that the rebellion had already led to "the complete breakdown of all civil government functions; the South Korean Constabulary had adopted "stalling tactics," whereas "vigorous action was required." People on the island were panicked by the violence, but they also would not yield to interrogators, even under torture: "blood ties which link most of the families on the Island ... make it extremely difficult to obtain information."

On May 22, 1948 Col. Brown directeed that the following procedures, to "break up" the revolt: Police were assigned definite missions to protect all coastal villages [from guerrillas]; to arrest rioters carrying arms, and to stop killing and terrorizing innocent citizens. The Constabulary was assigned the definite mission of breaking up all elements of the People's Democratic Army ... in the interior of the Island.

Brown also ordered widespread, continuing interrogation of all those arrested, and efforts to prevent supplies from reaching the guerrillas. Subsequently, he anticipated the institution of a long-range program "to offer positive proof of the evils of Communism," and to "show that the American way offers positive hope" for the Islanders. From May 28 to the end of July, more than 3,000 islanders were arrested.

Much other evidence demonstrated active American involvement in attempting to suppress the rebellion: the daily training of counter-insurgent forces, interrogation of prisoners, and the use of American spotter planes to ferret out guerrillas. One newspaper reported that American troops intervened in the Cheju conflict in at least one instance in late April 1948, and a group of Korean journalists even charged in June that Japanese officers and soldiers had secretly been brought back to the island to help in suppressing the rebellion. [13]

Col. Kim Yong-ju brought 3,000 soldiers in the Constabulary's 11th Regiment back to the mainland in early August, and told reporters that "almost all villages" on the island were vacant, the residents having fled either to the protection of guerrillas in the interior, or to the coast. He implied that far more had gone into the mountains. "The so-called `mountain man' is a farmer by day, rioter by night," the Cheju Constabulary commander said; "frustrated by not knowing the identity of these elusive men, the police in some cases carried out indiscriminate warfare against entire villages." When the Constabulary refused to adopt the same murderous tactics, the police called them communists. [14]

The 9th Regiment of the Constabulary later got control of several points in the highlands, and had herded village people toward the coasts, which enabled them to starve out guerrillas and push them out of their mountain redoubts. Naval ships had completely blockaded the island, making resupply of guerrillas from the mainland impossible. [15]

A KMAG [the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group--KMAG] account in late 1948 cited "considerable village burning" by the suppression command; three new Constabulary batallions were being recruited, the report said, "mainly from Northwest Youth." Islanders were now giving information on the guerrillas--apparently because their homes would be burned if they did not. [16]

By early 1949 more than seventy per cent of the island's villages had been burned, and tens of thousands of refugees were packed into the coastline. In April things got worse: Cheju Island was virtually overrun early in the month by rebels operating from the central mountain peak ... rebel sympathizers numbering possibly 15,000, sparked by a trained core of 150 to 600 fighters, controlled most of the island. A third of the population had crowded into Chejoo town, and 65,000 were homeless and without food. [17]

By this time 20,000 homes on the island had been destroyed, and one-third of the population (about 100,000) was concentrated in protected villages along the coast. Peasants were only allowed to cultivate fields near perimeter villages, owing to "chronic insecurity" in the interior and the fear that they would aid the insurgents. [18] But soon the guerrillas were basically defeated.

An American Embassy official, Everett Drumwright, reported in May 1948 that "the all-out guerrilla extermination campaign ... came to a virtual end in April with order restored and most rebels and sympathizers killed, captured, or converted." Ambassador John Muccio wired to Washington that "the job is about done."

Shortly it was possible to hold a special election, thus finally to send a Cheju Islander to the National Assembly; none other than Chang T'aek-sang, the long-time head of the Seoul Metroplitan Police, arrived to run for a seat.19 By August 1949 it was apparent that the insurgency had effectively ended. The rebel leader Yi Tuk-ku was finally killed. Peace came, but it was the peace of a political graveyard.

American sources reported that fifteen to twenty thousand islanders died, but the ROK's official figure was 27,719. The North Koreans said that more than 30,000 islanders had been "butchered" in the suppression. The Governor of Cheju, however, privately told American intelligence that 60,000 had died, and as many as 40,000 people had fled to Japan; officially 39,285 homes had been demolished, but the Governor thought "most of the houses on the hills" were gone: of 400 villages, only 170 remained. In other words one in every five or six islanders had perished, and more than half the villages were destroyed. [20]

The Northwest Youth now ran Cheju and continued "to behave in a very arbitrary and cruel manner" toward the islanders, according to Americans on the scene; "the fact that the Chief of Police was a member of this organization made matters even worse."

By the end of 1949, 300 of the Northwest Youth had joined the island police, and 200 were in business or local government: "the majority have become rich and are the favored merchants."

The senior military commander and the Vice-Governor were also from north Korea. Of course, "the rich men of the island" were once again influential, too, "despite the fact that governmental control has changed three times." About 300 "emaciated" guerrillas remained in the Cheju city jail, and another 200 were thought to be still on the loose, but inactive. Peasants and fishermen had to have daily police passes to work the fields or the ocean. [21]

Just before the war began in June 1950, a U.S. Embassy survey found the island peaceful, with no more than a handful of guerrillas. During the warfare at the Pusan perimeter in the summer of 1950, Americans reported that police had collected radios from the entire island population, so they could not find out about the North Korean progress on the mainland; the only telephone network was controlled by the police, and would be the main means of communication should the North Koreans seek to invade the island.

Americans thought, however, that a "subversive potential" still existed on Cheju, because of "an estimated 50,000 relatives of persons killed as Communist sympathizers in the rebellion." Fully 27,000 of the islanders had been enrolled in the National Guidance Alliance, an organization set up to convert leftists and run by the state. In 1954 an observer of Cheju wrote, "village guards man watchtowers atop stone walls; some villages have dug wide moats outside the walls and filled them with brambles, to keep bandits out." [22]

External Involvement and Counterinsurgency

American journalist Hugh Deane argued presciently in March 1948 that Korea would soon come to resemble the civil wars in Greece or North China: as in Greece, "North Korea will be accused of sending agitators and military equipment south of the 38th parallel and the Korean problem will be made to look as if it were simply southern defense against northern aggression."

Yet the worst problem, he thought, would come in the southwestern Chollas, as far from North Korea as any region save Cheju--which developed the biggest insurgency of all. [23] As it happened Deane's prediction was right on all counts: this was where the insurgency was strongest, and this became the American line--and not only that, but the judgement of history.

To the extent that anyone knows about the guerrilla conflict, it is assumed to be externally induced, by North Koreans with Soviet backing and weapons, with the Americans standing idly by while the Rhee regime fought the infiltrators.

Yet the evidence shows that the Soviets had no involvement with the southern partisans, the North Koreans were connected mainly to attempts at infiltration and guerrillas in Kangwon province, while the seemingly uninvolved Americans organized and equipped the southern counterinsurgent forces, gave them their best intelligence materials, planned their actions, and occasionally commanded them directly.

As the Cheju insurgency progressed, an event occurred that got much more attention, indeed international coverage: a rebellion at the southeastern port city of Y?u that soon spread to other counties in S. Cholla and S. Kyongsang, and that for a time seemed to threaten the foundations of the fledgling Republic. The proximate cause of the uprising was the refusal on October 19 of elements of the 14th and 6th Regiments of the ROK Army to embark for a counterinsurgency mission on Cheju.

Here, too, the commanders who actually subdued the rebels were Americans, assisted by several young Korean colonels: Chung Il-gwon, Chae Pyong-duk, and Kim Paek-il. Gen. William Roberts, the KMAG commander, ordered Americans to stay out of direct combat, but even that injunction was ignored from time to time. American advisors were with all ROK Army units, but the most important ones were a Colonel Harley E. Fuller, named chief advisor for the suppression, Captain James Hausman from KMAG G-3, and Captain John P. Reed from G-2 (Army intelligence). [24]

On October 20 the American G-2 intelligence chief recommended that KMAG "handle [the] situation" and command the Army in restoring order "without intervention of US troops." Roberts said that he planned "to contain and suppress the rebels at [the] earliest moment," and formed a party to fly to Kwangju on the afternoon of October 20 to command the operation. It consisted of Hausman, Reed, and a third American from KMAG; also an American in the Counter-Intelligence Corps, and Col. Chung Il-gwon.

The next day Roberts met with Song Ho-sang and urged him "to strike hard everywhere ... and allow no obstacles to stop him." Roberts' "Letter of instruction" to Song read,

Your mission is to meet the rebel attack with an overwhelmingly superior force and to crush it.... Because of their political and strategic importance, it is essential that Sunchon and Yosu be recaptured at an early date. The liberation of these cities from the rebel forces will be moral and political victories of great propaganda value.

American C-47 transports ferried Korean troops, weapons, and other materiel; KMAG spotter planes surveilled the area throughout the period of the rebellion; American intelligence organizations worked intimately with Army and KNP counterparts. [25]

Guerrillas built up their strength on the mainland after Yosu, and American advisors were all over the war zones in the South, constantly shadowing their Korean counterparts and urging them to greater effort. The man who distinguished himself in this was James Hausman, one of the key organizers of the suppression of the Yossu Rebellion, who spent the next three decades as perhaps the most important American operative in Korea, the liaison and nexus point between the American and Korean militaries and their intelligence outfits.

Hausman termed himself the father of the Korean Army in an interview, which was not far from the truth. He said that everyone knew this, including the Korean officers themselves, but could not say it publicly. In off-camera remarks, meanwhile, Hausman said that Koreans were "brutal bastards," "worse than the Japanese;" he sought to make their brutality more efficient, by showing them, for example, how to douse corpses of executed people with gasoline, thus to hide the method of execution or blame it on communists. [26] Back in the U.S., hardly anyone has ever heard of Hausman.

If the Rhee regime had one unqualified success, viewed through the American lens, it was the apparent defeat of the southern partisans by the spring of 1950. A year before it had appeared that the guerrilla movement would only grow with the passage of time; but a major suppression campaign begun in the fall of 1949 resulted in high body counts and a perception that the guerrillas could no longer mount significant operations when they would be expected to--as the spring foliage returned in early 1950.

Both Acheson and Kennan saw the suppression of the internal threat as the litmus test of the Rhee regime's continence: if this worked, so would American-backed containment; if it did not, the regime would be viewed as another Kuomintang.

Colonel Preston Goodfellow, formerly a high officer in the wartime OSS [forerunner of the CIA] had told Rhee in late 1948, in the context of a letter where he referred to his "many opportunities to talk with [Secretary of State Dean Acheson] about Korea," that the guerrillas had to be "cleaned out quickly ... everyone is watching how Korea handles the Communist threat."

A weak policy will lose support in Washington; handle the threat well, and "Korea will be held in high esteem." [27] American backing was thus crucial to the very willingness of the ROK Army to fight the guerrillas, whether on Cheju or the mainland.

Americans sang the praises of the Rhee regime's counterinsurgency campaign, even as internal accounts recorded nauseating atrocities. As early as February 1949, Drumwright reported that in S. Cholla "there was some not very discriminating destruction of villages" by the ROKA; but a week later he demonstrated his own support for such measures (if discriminate): "the only answer to the Communist threat is for non-Communist youth, after weeding out, to be organized just as tightly and for just as ruthless action as their Leftist counterparts." He even suggested that American missionaries be utilized for information on the guerrillas. [28]

The Americans and the Koreans were in constant conflict over proper counterinsurgent methods, but out of this tension came a mix of American methods and the techniques of suppression the Japanese had developed in Manchuria, for combating guerrillas in cold-weather, mountainous terrain, implemented by Korean officers who had served the Japanese (often in Manchuria).

The method was premised on using climate, terrain and unflinchingly brutal methods to separate the guerrillas from their peasant constituencies. Cold weather would deny them the protection of thick foliage and undetected movement, military encirclement and blockade would isolate base areas and prevent resupply of food and weaponry, and draconian methods would break the guerrilla/people nexus.

Winter drastically shifted the advantage to suppression forces. Large armies would establish the blockades, usually between the mountains and the low-lying fields and villages; small search and destroy units would then enter the mountains to ferret out guerrillas, often by tracking them in the snow.

As former Japanese army officers put it, winter made guerrillas stationary and the counterinsurgents mobile; the guerrillas holed up in winter shelters which well-supplied and protected troops sought out and burned. Rebuilding them was next to impossible "because everything is frozen." [29]

Conclusion

Walter Sullivan, a New York Times correspondent, was almost alone among foreign journalists in seeking out the truth of the guerrilla war on the mainland and Cheju. Large parts of southern Korea, he wrote in early 1950, "are darkened today by a cloud of terror that is probably unparalleled in the world." Guerrillas make brutal assaults on police, and the police take the guerrillas to their home villages and torture them for information. Then the police shoot them, and tie them to trees as an object lesson.

The persistence of the guerrillas, he wrote, "puzzles many Americans here," as does "the extreme brutality" of the conflict. But Sullivan went on to argue that "there is great divergence of wealth" in the country, with both middle and poor peasants living "a marginal existence." He interviewed ten peasant families; none owned all their own land, and most were tenants. The landlord took 30% of tenant produce, but additional exactions--government taxes, and various "contributions"--ranged from 48 to 70 per cent of the annual crop. [30]

The primary cause of the South Korean insurgency was the social inequity of land relations and the huge gap between a tiny elite of the rich and the vast majority of the poor. The North Koreans were barely involved, and indeed the strongest leftwing regions were precisely those furthest from the 38th parallel.

But on Cheju Island these same conditions were inflamed by a brutal Japanese occupation that led to a vast uprooting of the population, the simple justice of the popular administration that took effective power on the island in 1945 and held it until 1948, and the elemental injustice of the mainlander dictatorship that Syngman Rhee imposed and that the American legal authorities did nothing about--except to aid and abet it.

If it should come to pass that any Koreans succeed in gaining compensation from the American Government for the events of 1945 to 1953, certainly the people of Cheju should come first. For it was on that hauntingly beautiful island that the postwar world first witnessed the American capacity for unrestrained violence against indigenous peoples fighting for self-determination and social justice.

Footnotes and References

1.        For my full treatment of the American Occupation and relevant documentation, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1 and 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990).

2.        Korea Herald, August 26, 1997.

3.        Col. Donald Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? (Brooksville, Fla: Brownsville Prting Co., 1981), cited in Korea Web Weekly, www.kimsoft.com.

4.        Source to be supplied

5.        USFIK 11071 file, box 62/96, transcript of Hodge monologue to visiting Congressmen, Oct. 4, 1947; RG332, XXIV Corps Historical file, box 20, "Report of Special Investigation -- Cheju-Do Political Situation," March 11, 1948, conducted by Lt. Col. Lawrence A. Nelson. Nelson was on Cheju from Nov. 12, 1947 to Feb. 28, 1948.

6.        G-2 Weekly Summary no. 116, Nov. 23-30, 1947; Seoul Times, June 15, June 18, 1950. These issues reported the results of a survey by a team of journalists from Seoul.

7.        Seoul Times, June 18, Aug. 6, Aug. 11, 1948; G-2 Intelligence Summary no. 144, June 11-18, 1948; HUSAFIK, v.II, part 2, "Police and National Events, 1947-48." In a report to the National Assembly on the origins of the insurgency, Yi P?-s? traced it to "the propaganda and plots of the so-called People's Republic which sprang up right after Liberation," which were "still in existence" on Cheju. (895.00 file, box 7127, Drumwright to State, enclosing Yi P?-s?'s December 1948 report.) But the usual Rhee line was to blame it on the North Koreans.

8.        G-2 Intelligence Summaries nos.134-142, April 2-June 4, 1948; Seoul Times, April 7,8, 1948; HUSAFIK, "Police and National Events, 1947-48."

9.        Rothwell Brown Papers, Brown to Hodge, "Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island [sic] from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948."

10.     NDSM, Feb. 11, 1950. Cheju leftists and communists never had effective relations with the North Koreans, and even today the remnant survivors of the Cheju insurgents in Osaka remain independent, publishing accounts of the rebellion without taking a pro-Kim Il Sung line.

11.     RG94, Central Intelligence, entry 427, box no. 18343, 441st CIC detachment, report from Cheju of June 18, 1948.

12.     USFIK 11071 file, box 33, "Opinion on the Settlement of the Cheju Situation," July 23, 1948, by Ko Py?g-uk, KNP superintendent.

13.     Rothwell Brown Papers, Brown to Hodge, "Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island [sic] from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948; Seoul Times, June 5, June 7, 1948. I have found no evidence of the return of Japanese officers, but that does not mean it did not happen.

14.     Seoul Times, Aug. 6, Aug. 11, 1948; G-2 Intelligence Summary no. 146, June 25-July 2, 1948.

15.     Intelligence Summary no. 154, Aug. 21-27, no. 159, Sept. 24--Oct. 1, no. 163, Oct. 22-29, 1948; Rg94, Central Intelligence, entry 427, box no. 18343, 441st CIC detachment monthly report, Oct. 21, 1948; 895.00 file, box no. 7127, Drumwright to State, Jan. 7, Jan. 10, 1949.

16.     RG338, KMAG file, box 5412, Roberts, "Weekly activities," Nov. 8, Nov. 15, Dec. 6, 1948. Roberts also said that rebels were burning villages, but it seems to have been the official authorities who did most of the burning.

17.     895.00 file, box no. 7127, Drumwright to State, March 14, 1949; Muccio to State, April 18, 1949.

18.     F0317, piece no. 76258, Holt to Bevin, March 22, 1949.

19.     895.00 file, box no. 7127, Drumwright to State, May 17, 1949; Muccio to State, May 13, 1949. Chang had lost his bid for a seat from Seoul.

20.     "The Background of the Present War in Korea," Far Eastern Econmic Review (Aug. 31, 1950), pp. 233-37; this account is by an anonymous but knowledgeable American who served in the Occupation. See also Koh Kwang-il, "In Quest of National Unity," p. 149; Hapdong t'ongshin, June 27, 1949, quoted in Sun'gan t'ongshin, no. 34 (September 1949), p. 1. (I could not find the original of this report.) Also RG349, FEC G-2 Theater Intelligence, box 466, May 23, l950, G-2 report on Cheju, which has the Governor's figures. He put the pre-insurgency island population at 400,000, which I think is high. For a detailed North Korean account, see Yi S?g-y?, "The Struggle of the Southern Guerrillas for Unification of the Homeland," K?loja (January 1950), p. 18.

21.     box 7127, ibid., account of a survey of Cheju by Capt. Harold Fischgrund of KMAG, in Drumwright to Muccio, Nov. 28, 1949. Fischgrund thought all members of the NWY should be removed from the island, but of course they were not.

22.     795.00 file, box 4299, Drumwright to State, June 21, 1950; box 4268, Drumwright to Allison, Aug. 29, 1950, enclosing a survey, "Conditions on Cheju Island." See also Korean Survey, (March 1954), pp. 6-7. The Americans put Yi's death in June, but in awarding him a posthumous medal the North Koreans said he died in a guerrilla skirmish on the mainland in August, 1949. See NDSM, Feb. 11, 1950.

23.     Hugh Deane Papers, "Notes on Korea," March 20, 1948.

24.     "History of the Rebellion;" USFIK 11017 file, box 77/96, packet of documents in "Operation Yousi [sic]."

25.     "Operation Yousi," ibid., "G-3 to C/S," Oct. 20, 1948; "W.L. Roberts to CG, USAFIK," Oct. 20, 1948; "Capt. Hatcher to G-3," Oct. 21, 1948; "History of the Rebellion;" USFIK 11071 file, box 77/96, KMAG HQ to Gen. Song Ho-s?g, Oct. 21, 1948. The message is unsigned, but was presumably from Roberts. This file contains numerous original messages from Korean military and police units to and from USAFIK headquarters; also many daily intelligence reports. On the C-47s see 740.00l9 file, box C-215, Muccio to State, May 3, 1949. KMAG was at that time called PMAG, since it was still "provisional."

26.     Interview with Thames Television, February 1987. I did not attend this interview, but made notes in the immediate aftermath on what Hausman told the Thames crew both during the filmed interview, and in off-camera discussions. Hausman did not request confidentiality for the off-camera statements, for which there were three witnesses.

27.     Goodfellow Papers, box 1, draft of letter to Rhee, no date but late 1948.

28.     895.00 file, box 7127, Drumwright to State, Feb. 11, Feb. 21, 1949. In March 1949 Drumwright urged two vice-consuls to solicit political information from American missionaries: "Emphasize, at all times, that the Mission is fully aware that the Missionaries' work is fully understood to be non-political. Intimate, however, that their integration into the local scene and their business throughout the countryside both make it inevitable (especially with their command of the Korean language) that considerable `political' information come [sic] to their attention even without conscious effort. In the work of the U.S. Government to fight Communism and keep the Korean Government strong, it must know what is going on outside of Seoul, and just this miscellaneous Missionary information is invaluable."

See 895.00 file, box 7127, Drumwright directive included in Drumwright to State, March 17, 1949. See also ECA official Edgar A.J. Johnson's testimony to Congress on June 13, 1950, to the effect that the ROKA had killed 5000 guerrillas in the past year, and that it was "prepared to meet any challenge by North Korean forces," quoted in New York Times, July 6, 1950.

29.     "Military Studies on Manchuria,". The officers gave this as the reason why "Kim Il Sung and Choe Hyon went to the Soviet Union about February and returned to Manchuria about May or June."

30.     New York Times, March 6, March 15, 1950.

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